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Abstract 
In this paper we explore the growth of mathematical knowledge and in particular, seek 
to clarify the relationship between abstraction and context. Our method is to gain a deeper 
appreciation of the process by which mathematical abstraction is achieved and the nature of 
abstraction itself, by connecting our analysis at the level of observation with a corresponding 
theoretical analysis at an appropriate grain size. In this paper we build on previous work to 
take a further step towards constructing a viable model of the micro-evolution of 
mathematical knowledge in context. 
The theoretical model elaborated here is grounded in data drawn from a study of 10-11 
year olds’ construction of meanings for randomness in the context of a carefully designed 
computational microworld, whose central feature was the visibility of its mechanisms--how 
the random behavior of objects actually ―worked‖. In this paper, we illustrate the theory by 
reference to a single case study chosen to illuminate the relationship between the situation 
(including, crucially, its tools and tasks) and the emergence of new knowledge. Our 
explanation will employ the notion of situated abstraction as an explanatory device that 
attempts to synthesize existing micro- and macro-level descriptions of knowledge 
construction. One implication will be that the apparent dichotomy between mathematical 
knowledge as de-contextualized or highly situated can be usefully resolved as affording 
different perspectives on a broadening of contextual neighborhood over which a network of 
knowledge elements applies. 
 The Micro-Evolution of Mathematical Knowledge 3 
The Micro-Evolution of Mathematical Knowledge: The Case of Randomness 
Mathematical meanings are elusive. We know surprisingly little about their genesis. It 
has become fashionable, almost obligatory, to display constructivist credentials, and 
acknowledge that mathematical meanings are built on existing knowledge, that children (and 
adults) do not come to learning situations as tabula rasa, and that meanings are constructed by 
the individual (or, depending on taste, the relevant cultural group).  
The trouble is that this begs as many questions as it answers. It fails to address at a 
micro-level, the problem of how--if meanings are layered one on another--anything new is 
learned at all. What kind of grain-size do mathematical resources have? Are they like mini-
theories of the way the mathematical world works? Or are they atoms of fragmentary 
mathematical meanings, essentially standalone? If the former, how is change possible? If the 
latter, what structures these atoms and how does restructuring occur? By asking these sorts of 
questions, we create a hostage to fortune, as we cannot pretend to do more than point to some 
partial answers to a subset of these questions, not least because they pose problems which are 
independent of the mathematical knowledge domain, while we focus on just one. In this 
paper, therefore, we position ourselves firmly in the domain of theory construction, building 
on previous theoretical work (particularly in Noss and Hoyles, 1996) and we will illustrate 
our case by reference to a single case study of two children, drawn from a considerably larger 
corpus of data (Pratt, 1998a). 
Underpinning much discussion concerning the origin of mathematical knowledge lies 
the question of mathematical abstraction. It is a thorny question, whose problematic status 
has recently been addressed by a number of authors whose contributions we will consider 
below. A central issue is the extent to which mathematical abstraction depends on de-
contextualization, or more generally, to explicate the relationship between abstraction and 
context. One of the difficulties surrounding the clarification of the relationship between 
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mathematical abstraction and de-contextualization, is that the finished ―product‖--
mathematical abstraction considered as an achieved state of thought--certainly appears to 
involve a state of having cut loose from contextual boundaries, and a breadth of application 
across settings. But this does not, in itself, deal sufficiently with the process. If mathematical 
abstraction means de-contextualization, does this involve a blurring of boundaries between 
contexts? Or a new cognitive mechanism to map abstraction onto different contexts? What, 
in any case, is it that is abstracted? Does mathematical abstraction involve a process of 
transfer, conceived in traditional psychological terms, in which knowledge in a single context 
is mapped out of old contexts and into new ones?  
A common approach is to regard mathematical abstraction as a strictly hierarchical 
process, progressing through a series of stages. For example, Dubinsky (1991) forwards the 
notion of a ―process,‖ an interiorized version of an action in which a repeatable physical or 
mental transformation of an object or objects takes place. At some point, a process can be 
transformed by an object, when, according to this theory, the process has been encapsulated 
to become an ―object.‖ Sfard (see, for example, 1991) also regards the isolation of 
mathematical objects as a key achievement of mathematical abstraction.  
These process/object models have taken steps beyond identifying and labeling stages of 
mathematical abstraction: For example, Sfard (1994), in a paper in which she adopts a richer 
and more sociolinguistic stance than that of her 1991 work, has described reification as the 
birth of metaphor, which renders the knowledge more integrative and manipulable; Gray and 
Tall (1994) refer to the ambiguous nature of process and object. 
While these and other contributions represent a helpful development in the theoretical 
literature, they are nonetheless somewhat limited in their capacity to describe the process by 
which the various states of abstraction are achieved (other workers have similar misgivings: 
see, for example, Confrey and Costa, 1996). We believe that a further step would result from 
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reappraising the relationship between mathematical abstraction and de-contextualization and 
elaborating the process by which knowledge becomes abstracted. This project would need to 
pay particular attention to the role of the setting in the construction of mathematical 
knowledge.  
One way of thinking about the role of setting has been strongly influenced by the 
paradigm of situated cognition. The strength of this view derives, in no small part, from the 
work of Jean Lave (1988) who showed convincingly how settings shape strategies for 
individuals, how problems are solved in the course of action, structured by activity. 
Overarching strategies or generalized solutions have little place in everyday experience; 
mathematics in situ has no need for universal laws, consistency, generality--it is concerned 
with getting the job done using whatever affordances are available. People do just enough to 
cope with the demands of the setting in which they find themselves. The strong case is made 
by Resnick, who argues that: ―every cognitive act must be viewed as a specific response to a 
specific set of circumstances. Only by understanding the circumstances and the participants’ 
construal of the situation can a valid interpretation of the cognitive activity be made‖ 
(Resnick, 1991, p. 2).  
We have argued elsewhere (Noss & Hoyles, 1996) that this view leads into a 
mathematical cul-de-sac. For if it is really true that every act is nothing more than a specific 
response to a specific set of circumstances, how does mathematical knowledge grow? What 
can be salvaged from the idea of mathematical abstraction? Mathematics is the science of 
structure and pattern, the study of relationships between relationships; and to that extent at 
least, it cannot be immutably tied to real referents, situations whose meaning is contingent 
upon the particularities of setting: at least not in the traditional sense of ―real‖. 
Other workers have proposed alternative ways of conceptualizing mathematical 
abstraction. For example, Wilensky (1991) proposes that one should view the concreteness of 
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a concept as a function of the relationship between the learner and the concept. He suggests 
that, as one becomes more and more familiar with an idea, one makes more and more 
connections with it; one concretizes the concept. According to this view, ideas become 
increasingly concrete. Advanced mathematical concepts are neither more nor less abstract per 
se. For an individual who has not had the opportunity or does not yet possess the internal 
connections, a concept will be abstract, disconnected. That same concept may be quite 
concrete for another individual. 
Noss & Hoyles (1996) go beyond considering the individual in the process of 
abstracting knowledge. Building on Wilensky’s theme of connections, they extend the idea to 
considering a whole network of such links, encompassing not only the individual but also 
resources external to that person. We will use the word ―resources‖ from now on, rather than 
variations on ―meanings,‖ ―knowledge,‖ ―concepts,‖ etc., to emphasize the complementary 
roles played by internal (cognitive) and external (physical or virtual) sources of meaning 
making. Thus the term resource will encompass both external tools and internal knowledge, 
including both informal knowledge like intuitions and formal conceptual knowledge. To 
describe this network, Noss and Hoyles use the idea of webbing to evoke the ways that 
learners come to construct new mathematical knowledge by forging and reforging internal 
connections through the interaction of internal and external resources during activity and in 
reflection upon it. The notion of webbing aims, therefore, to recognize the central 
significance of tools as external resources that shape the nature of the mathematical resources 
constructed, resources that have been observed to be highly dependent upon the particular 
attributes of those tools as cognized by students. 
As a way of pinpointing what kind of knowledge emerges in the course of activity, 
Noss and Hoyles propose the notion of situated abstraction (see Hoyles and Noss, 1992; Noss 
and Hoyles, 1996). Situated abstractions emerge during activity as internal resources that 
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serve as relatively general devices for making sense of situations that arise within a setting. 
The idea tries to describe the types of knowledge that enable learners to reflect on the 
structures within a setting and make sense of phenomena that hold true across it. At the same 
time, a situated abstraction, or, to put it more exactly, the relationships and actions based 
upon the situated abstraction, are expressed in a language (not necessarily verbally 
articulated) that remains embedded in the situation in which it was constructed, potentially 
constraining its validity in new contexts, with different tools and affordances. 
Formal abstraction is, by definition, characterized by its separation from the situation(s) 
that give rise to it. A crucial property of formal abstraction is that it occurs within a discourse 
which has its own syntax and semantics, and which is distinct from its genetic context. It is 
this which gives formal abstraction its appearance of containing objective essence, and which 
is responsible for the assumption that this essence exists in a form which allows it to be 
―transferred‖ to new situations (see Noss, Hoyles, & Pozzi, in press, for a study which uses 
the idea of situated abstraction in the context of understanding professional practices). 
It is precisely that mathematical abstraction is generally expressed in a formalism with 
its own rules of transformation that affords it its extraordinary power. The closure of the 
formal system is crucial for this capacity: it arises because relationships within the formal 
system can be articulated without the ―noise‖ that is characteristic of real systems. Situated 
abstraction, on the other hand, emphasizes connection with situations, not seeking to 
challenge the utility of formal abstraction, but maintaining that abstraction can take place in 
situ rather than only within a self-contained system mentally and/or physically remote from it. 
The central premise is that individuals can and do find invariances which span settings, 
but this is not always best described as a mapping from a situation to some other mental 
realm and back again. Individuals can abstract knowledge within settings and remain tied to 
the objects and relationships within the situation, its tools, linguistic conventions and 
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structures. Situated abstraction is observable as more or less tacitly articulated invariance of 
relationships, framed within the situation itself. 
By blurring external and internal resources, Noss and Hoyles bring into close proximity 
mathematical abstraction and its setting. Other workers have made similar observations, 
notably Nemirovsky (in press) who has described situated generalizing, as a recognition of 
the generalization process where there is no fixed boundary between experienced phenomena 
and ―the realm where the generalization takes place.‖ His approach focuses a little more 
closely on the process of generalization, whereas, in this paper at least, our interest centers 
more on the conceptual domain.  
The foregoing ideas offer variations on a theme that blur any strong distinctions 
between experience out there and mathematical abstraction in here. Whilst such theories 
provide constructs that elaborate the relationship between mathematical abstraction and de-
contextualization at the macro-level, there is much to do in elaborating what processes of 
abstraction in situ might mean at a greater level of detail. Thus, in the remainder of this 
paper, our goal will be to refine macro-level descriptions of the emergence of new 
mathematical knowledge by studying the relationship between tool-use and situation, and in 
so doing, elaborate some of the micro-level details of the webbing idea.  
In order to achieve this objective, we need to integrate the macro-level ideas of 
webbing and abstraction into existing micro-level descriptions of knowledge construction. 
This is what we mean by the term ―micro-evolution‖ in the title. A good place to start is to 
ask how intuitive or primitive knowledge gets there in the first place. diSessa (1983) 
proposes that we abstract primitive intuitions directly from experience, that knowing is 
essentially phenomenological. He argues that ―p-prims‖ (phenomenological primitives) are a 
collection of heterarchical and rich ways of seeing and sometimes explaining the world (e.g., 
things move in the direction you push them). They are relatively minimal abstractions of 
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simple common phenomena and are stored in what he calls the ―causal net,‖ a network of 
primitive sense-making causal relationships. As learning develops, these p-prims become 
increasingly structured and ―co-ordination classes‖ are formed. This structuring can be 
thought of as connections between p-prims that enable clusters of p-prims to be 
simultaneously (more or less) triggered by observed characteristics of phenomena. Such 
clusters roughly parallel what other writers might refer to as a ―concept‖ but which diSessa 
calls a ―co-ordination class‖ (diSessa, 1993). 
According to diSessa, conceptual change occurs in three ways, each involving a 
transformation of the causal net: (i) by the addition of new p-prims, (ii) by the formation of 
new connections between p-prims, and (iii) by changes to the priorities which fix how likely 
a p-prim is to be triggered by incoming data (its cueing or reliability priority), in terms of its 
consistency with other p-prims or with further incoming data. The unstructured p-prims live 
in relative isolation, and although they may be triggered individually by phenomena, they will 
not then reliably trigger further p-prims. P-prims would remain unstructured if incoming data 
were not inconsistent with those p-prims or if there were no further incoming data. When p-
prims are seen to be consistent with each other on a regular basis, they become highly 
structured so that a whole cluster is always triggered at the same time. 
diSessa’s detailed model of conceptual change is helpful, not only because it offers 
clarity at both micro and macro-levels, but also because it makes provision, through the 
clustering of p-prims and through the mechanism of priorities attached to p-prims, for the 
construction, and possible evolution, of situationally-dependent knowledge.  
While diSessa’s formulation is an attractive starting point for our own work, there are a 
number of issues that caution against a too-casual application of the theory to the task at 
hand. The first concerns diSessa’s focus on physics, which leads him to consider causality as 
the phenomenological basis for p-prims. This seems at first sight to stand in contrast with 
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mathematical knowledge, which seeks to express meanings through inference, independent of 
context. In what follows, we will not elaborate the causal/inferential distinction. More 
generally, we will have to be cautious about an oversimplified mapping of p-prims to situated 
abstraction: As observables at the macro-level, situated abstractions are relatively (to p-prims 
at the micro-level) complex and likely to depend upon collections of p-prims (and much more 
besides).  
The second issue relates to the role of tools in shaping the construction of mathematical 
knowledge. It would be useful to elaborate the relationship between the cueing of p-prims (or 
any similar mechanism) and the perceived functions of tools within a setting. If we could 
understand this issue more clearly, we might be able to elaborate how the web is shaped to 
make some resources more likely to be used than others in any particular situation. 
The third issue involves the problem of de-contextualization. DiSessa uses the term 
―tuning towards expertise‖ to describe the move towards more expert forms of knowledge. In 
mathematics, one characteristic of expert knowledge is its apparent cutting away from 
context. Any model of mathematical meaning-making should account for some process by 
which elements of knowledge take on more coherent structures, in which, perhaps, learners 
constructing situated abstractions come to coordinate them with each other, or with existing 
knowledge. We would like to address, therefore, how re-structuring might provide some 
insight into the decontextualization problem.  
These three issues will guide our discussion in what follows, and we now consider each 
in turn. 
The Problematic Nature of Context and Mathematical Abstraction 
(i) What is abstracted? 
The urge to describe how things work is, it seems, primitive to humans. The sense that 
contact with moving things conveys motion, or that pushing harder makes objects move 
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faster, relates to a recognition that the world works in a (mostly) causal way, that phenomena 
have explanations for the way they work. What is the equivalent insight for mathematics? Is 
the insight that ―multiplication makes bigger‖ or--more relevantly for our own study--
―random sequences are patternless‖ causal in nature? Perhaps so. The distinction between 
inference and causality is, after all, an adult rather than a child distinction, and there is little 
reason to doubt that children’s beliefs about randomness are shaped by their experiences with 
throwing dice and tossing coins. P-prims, whether causal or inferential, are abstractions of 
reality, not mere descriptions of it. On the other hand, the intuition that, say, randomly-
generated events give rise to patternless sequences does appear--at this stage we are being 
necessarily vague--to necessitate a degree of inference that, say, ―force causes movement,‖ 
does not. We note, however, that diSessa (1993) recognizes that the genesis of p-prims 
―might be more complex than a simple abstraction schematization of a phenomenon‖ (p. 
151), a statement which identifies the possibility that sense-making devices such as p-prims 
can be made out of other, more primitive devices.  
We ought at this point to discuss the question of language in the process of knowledge 
construction and application, as we have several times in the foregoing discussion, loosely 
used terms like ―articulation‖ and ―expression.‖ In this respect, we need to consider the 
micro-level and macro-levels separately. From a micro-level perspective, it is reasonable to 
agree with diSessa that p-prims are not strongly associated with dictionary lexicon: 
Much less do they have explicit propositional form. . . . Subjects may make 
predictions on the basis of a p-prim, but the prediction is not the p-prim. 
(Ibid. p. 119.) 
However, if we consider a larger grain size of knowledge, there may be some 
interesting differences. A situated abstraction is an articulated expression of invariant 
relationships perceived within a setting, and expressed within the tools and linguistic forms 
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of the setting. Note that this may, or may not, have much to do with dictionary lexicons: the 
linguistic structures may well have as much to do with mouse-clicks or gesture as spoken 
language. In this case, while we may certainly agree that the prediction is not the p-prim--or 
any other knowledge structure--it might sometimes be quite difficult to distinguish between 
the two. We will have more to say on this when we have illustrated our thinking with data on 
children’s ideas about randomness below. 
 (ii) How is it abstracted? What is the role of tools? 
We take it as axiomatic that the external resources available for making sense shape the 
knowledge development in fundamental ways. Our particular interest centers on the 
relationship between external tools and the set of internal resources--however structured--that 
the learner possesses at any time. If we wish to understand how new knowledge is developed, 
it might help to get a clearer picture of how specific pieces of knowledge and the 
relationships between them are activated by the experience of encountering the (real or 
virtual) world. This is, of course, a tall order. But a model that shed light on the relationship 
between external resources and the evolution of mathematical knowledge would have 
pedagogic value: We could gain a handle on how to provide tools and activity structures with 
optimal opportunities for supporting the construction of new knowledge.  
This is, in essence, the fundamental design problem of mathematics education. And it is 
here that we believe that digital technologies hold particular promise. Our use of digital 
technologies in the study we report here is not at all centered on any a priori belief that we 
can build the right tool to ―enhance understanding.‖ Rather, our aim is to harness what 
Seymour Papert (1982) has called the ―Protean‖ quality of digital technologies, the 
possibilities they afford for building and rebuilding virtual structures and to observe the ways 
in which people interact with them. This is what we mean when we call the computer a 
―window‖ on mathematical meanings (Noss and Hoyles, 1996): it is a screen on which we 
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and our students can express aspirations and ideas, and which — because these ideas must be 
made more or less explicit — afford considerable insight to the researcher in the process. It is 
in this sense that we claim the process of design as a contribution to the process of theory 
building.  
(iii) Is mathematical abstraction de-contextualized? 
We stated earlier that de-contextualization appears to play a crucial role in the process 
of mathematical abstraction. Yet all of the literature on situated cognition and much besides, 
shows just how problematic this is, as even without the strong version of the situated 
cognition thesis, we accept that knowledge in general tends to remain tied to the situation that 
gave rise to it. If we consider that phenomenological knowledge exists as some kind of causal 
network, then it appears incontrovertible that it maintains a strong link to the original 
primitive intuitions abstracted directly from experience.  
From the point of view of mathematics, two questions arise. First, what exactly is de-
contextualization? It will be necessary to refine what we mean by a mathematical context, 
and try to characterize what we mean by situational specificity in order to see whether and 
how learners sometimes break out of contexts (and, of course, whether ―break out‖ is the 
right metaphor at all). 
A second question concerns abstraction. The etymology of the word speaks for itself: 
the assumption is that abstraction demands a pulling away from context. Once achieved, there 
is no doubt that from a mathematical point of view, it is this that lends mathematics its power 
as a means to describe the world. But how is it achieved? In what circumstances? And, more 
importantly, is it a binary state system, in which one either has or has not abstracted? 
Whatever the case, we ought to be able to say something about mathematical abstraction-in-
progress, particularly if we set things up so that we can study learning in a relatively 
transparent way within appropriate computational settings.  
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We now wish to set out as clearly as possible our goal, which in general terms is to 
develop a model of the micro-evolution of mathematical knowledge in context.  
Elements of a Model for Mathematical Abstraction in Context 
The study of abstraction must involve the consideration of currently accessible external 
and internal resources. Even if, finally, mathematical abstraction appears to be de-
contextualized, it would be remiss to assume that context plays no part in the process of 
abstracting. Indeed, there is every reason to believe the role of tools is fundamental, begging 
the question as to how mathematical abstraction comes to appear cut off from context. This 
approach to the study of mathematical abstraction leads us to the conclusion that a model for 
how mathematical knowledge grows must contain five essential elements: 
1. A clear description of the nature of naïve mathematical knowledge including the 
grain size of emergent mathematical knowledge. 
2. A description of the setting, including structuring resources designed to perturb 
thinking and to act as a window onto conceptual evolution. 
3. A detailed elaboration of the nature of new knowledge and its relation during 
evolution to prior knowledge. 
4. The relationship between new knowledge and the setting in which that knowledge 
is constructed. 
5. A proposition that elaborates whether and how prior knowledge illuminates sense-
making in unfamiliar settings. 
Elements 1 and 3 consider the potential role for current mathematical knowledge in the 
development of new knowledge. Elements 2 and 4 consider the analogous role for external 
resources. Element 5 aims to present a coherent statement in which the respective role of both 
internal and external resources are discussed in relation to the situatedness of mathematical 
knowledge. These five elements will act as organizing points for the subsequent sections. 
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We will illustrate the five elements with reference to the developing ideas of a pair of 
children, part of a larger study of 10-11 year-old children’s construction of resources for 
randomness (Pratt, 1998a, 1998b, 2000). At the risk of repeating ourselves, we should 
emphasize that the model we outline here is derived from a number of prior studies (some of 
which are collected in Noss & Hoyles, 1996) and, with respect to the issue of randomness 
discussed in this paper, from detailed data analysis of Pratt’s (1998a) study. The data reported 
in this paper, therefore, should be viewed as exemplifying the theoretical construction, rather 
than as a corpus of data from which we are attempting to (over-)generalize. 
The theoretical framework presented here has emerged through reflection on the data 
from the original study. Although in this paper we present fragments of that data chosen for 
its illustrative value, it is helpful for the reader to know some of the methodological details of 
the original study. (The computer environment itself will be described in Element 2.) 
The methodology of the broader study was founded on an iterative design in which the 
study of the children alternated with the development of computer-based tools and resources. 
We worked with a new group of children in each iteration. 32 children, aged 10 and 11 years, 
were studied in all, with the final iteration involving 16 children. Each child was interviewed 
individually using a semi-structured schedule in which the children expressed their ideas 
about randomness before working with the computer-based tools. The early interactions with 
the tools provided further insights into the nature of this initial knowledge. Element 1 of our 
theoretical model represents insights gained from those interviews and early interactions with 
the microworld. The children worked with the microworld in pairs for between 2 and 2.5 
hours. In these activities, the researcher acted as a participant observer, interacting with the 
children in order to probe the reasons behind their actions, later interpreting these reasons in 
the light of observations based on their and other children’s work. The approach throughout 
was to allow the children to be in control of their explorations, making decisions and moving 
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in directions of their own choice. Most interventions were intended to be neutral with respect 
to changing the direction of the children’s thinking. Typically such interventions were 
concerned with explaining technical matters or probing what lay behind a child’s actions. 
More directed interventions were used when the children were clearly stuck or embarked 
upon a path with no potential pay-off from either research or learning perspectives. 
Experimental interventions were also used to probe for the maximal level of performance that 
the child’s internal resources, supported by the computer’s tools, could achieve. Such 
interventions were only used when a child seemed to be particularly confident and already 
performing with some degree of fluency. 
The actions and discussions of the children were video-taped. Case accounts, avoiding 
as far as possible interpretation, were developed from the transcripts. (Some of the illustrative 
transcripts in this paper include descriptive comments from the case accounts.) These 
accounts were the basis for subsequent case analyses in which various inferences were made 
as to why and how the children’s internal resources were modified. The case analyses drew 
on the transcripts of the pre-interviews as well as the case accounts of the activities. These 
case analyses were made available for a colleague and differences of opinion about the 
inferences were discussed and resolved. 
A trace of each pair’s work was developed. This trace indicated the path taken 
including the situated abstractions articulated during that journey. (The trace in Figure 5 is a 
graphical summary of what were very detailed traces.) The case analyses and traces were 
studied and compared across children to identify consistencies and marked differences. 
Consistency of an issue from case to case provided a check on reliability whilst variations 
suggested the limitations. The theoretical model developed here is based on this corpus of 
data although we only provide one case as an illustration of the theory. 
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Element 1: Naïve knowledge 
In these data, children were observed to use four separable resources for articulating 
randomness, namely unsteerability, irregularity, unpredictability and fairness. In each case, 
we use a single example to illustrate how the resource was expressed more generally. In this 
way, we provide a first glimpse of our view of the nature of naïve mathematical knowledge. 
(i) Unpredictability 
Objects like dice were often described as unpredictable. For example, in response to the 
question, ―Do you think there is any number which is harder to get than any other number?‖ 
one child commented, ―No . . . because it just comes out at random and any number could 
come out at any time so you don’t really know which one is going to come out or which one 
is not going to come out.‖ 
The apparent connection between unpredictability and random devices was very commonly 
expressed. Indeed, for many children, a way of checking the randomness of a device was to 
see if it was possible to predict outcomes. 
(ii) Unsteerability 
Phenomena were often seen as random when no known agent was involved in 
determining the result. For example, when asked to summarize how he would decide on 
randomness, one child responded, ―Well, you decide by . . . if you’re not controlling it or if 
you’re not affecting it by doing anything, and if it’s like not bad weather or anything or 
nothing’s blowing it over or anything, that will be quite random, but if the wind was blowing 
it or you were putting force or it or something then it’s not that random.‖ 
The primitiveness of unsteerability is also seen in the way it is often used to ―explain‖ 
other resources for randomness. Very frequently, children associated unpredictability with 
unsteerability. On such occasions, unpredictability was usually seen as the outcome of 
uncontrolled input.  
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(iii) Irregularity 
A third way of making sense of random phenomena was through reference to the lack 
of a regular pattern in sequences of results. This resource was often linked closely to 
prediction so that patterns were conjectured on the basis of past results and then used to make 
predictions, which were tested by further trials. For example, when asked how he would test 
the fairness of a dice, one child answered, ―Testing it, I’d roll it and if it kept on going on one 
or another then I might think it’s got like a magnet or something inside it . . . I’d test it about 
ten, fifteen times.‖ 
(iv) Fairness 
Fairness was often a defining characteristic of randomness. For example, one set of 
questions in the interview was designed to ascertain how the child thought about two 
spinners, one of which had uniform sectors and another, which had unequal size sectors. On 
the first uniform spinner, children often expressed concerns that the spinner may not be 
unsteerable but nevertheless recognized that there was no particular bias towards one number. 
In contrast, the same child would often regard the non-uniform spinner as non-random. One 
child commented, ―No, because whoever made this, made the one and the three bigger so 
you’ll get the one and the three most of the time.‖ 
The excerpts illustrate the nature of naïve knowledge of randomness as observed 
throughout our interviews and as frequently observable in early interactions with the 
software. Below we outline five aspects of this naïve knowledge. 
We observed children articulating different naïve resources within moments of each 
other. For example, a child referred to the unsteerability of a device and moments later 
referred instead to its unpredictability; the fact that situations that were not controlled were 
often not predictable apparently encouraged children to express these resources 
interchangeably. 
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It seemed that different aspects of the setting cued different resources. For example, the 
physical appearance of an everyday spinner sometimes cued an awareness of a lack of 
fairness, whereas in the computer setting, attention was drawn to the use of the strength 
control (see Figure 1) and so unsteerability and unpredictability were cued. The change in 
focus of attention for the child seemed to stimulate different resources. 
Their interchangeability suggests that these naïve resources were connected in the sense 
that when one resource was triggered another (connected) resource was automatically 
available as well. It is important to have some sense of the strength of that connection within 
naïve resources. We often noticed children articulating different naïve resources as if they 
were interchangeable when to the expert they may have seemed contradictory. For example, a 
non-uniform spinner was often regarded as non-random because it was not fair, even though 
it was neither predictable nor controllable. Some children resolved this by expressing degrees 
of predictability (a uniform spinner being less predictable than a non-uniform one) but most 
children never articulated any awareness of such contradictions. If the fairness and 
unpredictability resources had been strongly connected, the triggering of fairness would have 
triggered unpredictability and one would have expected the children to recognize some 
dissonance. It seems then that the apparent interchangeability of naïve resources was not due 
to a strong connection between them, and may simply have been because attributes of the 
setting that triggered one resource often appeared coincidentally with aspects that triggered 
another. 
Naïve resources were used, at least initially, to construct meanings for long-term as 
well as short-term behavior. There was little attempt in the early interactions with the gadgets 
to diagnose their behavior in terms of aggregated results. Even when relatively large numbers 
of trials were generated, the children searched for local regularities in results. 
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Our final observation regarding naïve knowledge of randomness relates to the 
relationship in children’s minds between random and deterministic behavior. The short-term 
behavior of the gadgets was often explained by reference to cause and effect. A typical way 
of working was for the children to begin by conjecturing possible deterministic reasons for a 
gadget’s initial behavior. Further results though did not support that conjecture and an 
alternative deterministic conjecture was found. When this failed too, yet another reason for 
the behavior was proposed, though at some point, when sufficient testing has been carried 
out, the search for such explanations came to an end and the behavior was described as 
random. 
There is a strong sense in which stochastic meanings are constructed to deal with those 
aspects of the world that cannot be deterministically explained. It is no coincidence that the 
children’s actions usually involved searching for deterministic behavior since it is impossible 
to look for stochastic behavior when it is characterized only in terms of the absence of 
various attributes: a lack of predictability, a lack of sequential patterns, and a lack of control 
(fairness is a notable exception being sometimes observable from the physical characteristics 
of the device). A richer appreciation of the stochastic must involve the identification of 
positive features and these lie in long-term behavior. 
The above characterization of naïve resources for randomness is strikingly resonant 
with diSessa’s, who describes p-prims as multitudinous, small pieces of knowledge that are 
self-evident, not needing justification and weakly connected. Naïve knowledge of 
randomness then seems to have many of the characteristics of diSessa’s p-prims. 
The children in this study hardly ever articulated in the initial interviews an 
appreciation of the significance of aggregating results over the long term. When asked how to 
determine the fairness of a dice, children referred to the appearance of the dice (fairness) or 
they threw the dice a relatively small number of times (irregularity). Children never referred 
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to the frequencies of a particular outcome over a period of time. If any aggregating strategy 
existed at all for these children, it had low cueing priority. We will see later how new 
knowledge of this kind did begin to emerge. 
Element 2: The Setting 
A detailed model of mathematical abstraction in context demands a clear description of 
the context itself, including the available tools and resources. We chose to use a 
computational setting because we believe that a computational environment provides a 
unique opportunity to tune the tools available within the setting to our research agenda. We 
iteratively designed a stochastic microworld, Chance-Maker, based upon Boxer,
1
 which is 
particularly suited to our purposes. The aim was that this setting would enable us to observe 
children’s naïve and emergent knowledge through their actions with the tools. In addition, we 
required that the virtual environment would enable us to look closely at the children’s 
thinking as they moved from one setting to another. Let us consider exactly how Chance-
Maker provided these three windows--on naïve knowledge, on emergent knowledge and on 
new knowledge across settings. 
Providing a window on naïve knowledge 
In order to observe naïve knowledge, we had to design tools that would cue current 
resources for randomness, unpredictability, unsteerability, irregularity and fairness. Chance-
Maker contained a number of gadgets that behaved in many identifiable respects like their 
everyday counterparts. Consider for example the COIN gadget. 
The COIN gadget can be activated using a ―strength bar‖ causing it to spin much like 
its everyday equivalent. Figure 1 depicts the strength as a solid black bar with a circular 
switch at one end. Imagine the child controlling the strength by allowing a tube (the black 
bar) to fill with a red fluid until the switch is clicked. The strength of the throw, 30% in this 
case, is represented by the amount of red fluid. Clicking directly on the COIN causes it to be 
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tossed with the strength already indicated on the strength bar i.e. the strength used on the 
previous occasion. It spins like a coin, indicating the result on its front surface. 
Figure 1 
We hoped that asking children about the behavior of the COIN, and specifically whether they 
thought it was working properly, would provide a valuable window on how they thought 
about randomness. 
Providing a window on new knowledge 
In order to observe the evolution of new knowledge, we needed to provide tools that 
would perturb thinking. We did this by offering structuring resources that went beyond those 
to be found in everyday situations. For example, the COIN gadget can in fact be opened up to 
reveal a range of new tools (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 
Of particular importance is one tool that we encouraged the children to call the 
―workings box.‖ This tool captures the mathematical essence of how the COIN works. In one 
sense, the workings box is a formal symbolic description of the behavior of a coin. In this 
respect, it encapsulates the notion of a probability distribution. In addition, and we see this as 
a critical design attribute, the workings box can be edited by the child. When the workings 
box is modified, the behavior of the COIN will change correspondingly. We intended that the 
child’s re-programming of the workings box would provide a window on how they began to 
understand that correspondence. 
We also provided a repeat tool (Logo-style), to facilitate the use of large numbers of 
trials. The ON/OFF button allows the graphics to be toggled essentially to save time when 
repeating many trials. The NEW button allows the start of a new experiment by clearing out 
old results; the results box simply lists all results since the NEW button was last clicked. By 
clicking on one corner of the results box, a chart of the results is displayed instead of the list. 
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Two types of chart are possible, generated by clicking on the PIE or PIC buttons. A pie chart 
shows the proportions of the results for each outcome whilst a pictogram indicates in absolute 
terms the frequency of each outcome. The pictogram is not automatically scaled and so 
differences between the number of results for each outcome are often brought to the child’s 
attention. There is a feature to scale the pictogram; by increasing the scale, differences 
between rows in the pictogram will then be reduced proportionately. We intended that the use 
of the repeat and charting tools would provide a window on emerging ideas about 
aggregation of results and the relationship with the configuration of the workings box. 
Asking the children to mend the COIN gadget provided a sense of purpose for their 
activity and, through their activity with the workings box, a window on their emerging 
knowledge about randomness. 
Providing a window on different settings 
We needed to create different settings to enable us to observe children’s thinking 
during the transition from one setting to another. We replicated the features of the COIN 
gadget in a series of new gadgets. By keeping the structuring resources more or less invariant 
across the different gadgets, we could observe the influence of prior expectations, differences 
in appearance, and differences in detail, for example in the contents of the workings box. In 
this paper, we will focus on the children’s engagement with just three gadgets, the COIN, the 
SPINNER and the DICE. Figure 3 illustrates the workings of the SPINNER gadget. The 
workings box and the graphic of the SPINNER indicates a bias towards 1. When the child 
modifies the workings box, the graphic automatically changes to remain consistent. 
Figure 3 
Figure 4 depicts the workings box of the DICE gadget, which contains a bias towards 
sixes. 
Figure 4 
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By tracing children’s actions and articulations across gadgets as they explored whether 
the gadget was working properly and as they attempted to mend a broken gadget, we were 
able to observe the relationship between the specificities of the setting and the construction of 
new knowledge. We were also able to observe whether and how knowledge constructed in a 
previous setting (a prior gadget) was utilized, or not, in making sense of activity in an 
unfamiliar setting (a new gadget). 
Element 3: New knowledge 
We are not proposing at this point to present the chronology of how new resources 
evolved, but, rather unconventionally, to set out in advance the nature of the new knowledge 
as it eventually emerged in order subsequently to focus on how that ending was reached. 
More specifically, in elements 4 and 5 we will trace the evolution of this knowledge in 
relation to the settings in which it was constructed, and at that point we will illustrate in much 
more detail the nature of those new resources. For now, we offer a definition of two new 
resources, but a proper appreciation of those definitions will emerge during elements 4 and 5. 
We have labeled the new resources Large Number (N) and Distribution (D). 
The Large Number resource (N) 
As children worked, they naturally used the graphing tools to display the frequencies (or in 
the case of the pie chart, the relative frequencies) of each possible outcome. They tried to use 
this graphical information to make sense of the gadget and in particular to decide whether 
further mending was necessary. Typically, they began using small numbers of trials to test the 
operation of the coin and spinner gadgets, but as time went by they worked with larger 
numbers of trials and began to observe invariants in the appearance of the pie chart. In 
situations where the workings box had been modified to represent a uniform distribution, 
they eventually recognized that the pie chart had roughly equal sectors when the number of 
trials was large. We regard this insight as intuitively related to the Law of Large Numbers, 
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and we label it the Large Number resource, N, which can be expressed as ―the larger the 
number of trials, the more even the pie chart.‖ 
The Distribution resource (D) 
In order for N to develop in such a way that it can be applied successfully to non-uniform 
distributions, there is a need to recognize the formal description of distribution inherent in the 
workings box in the gadgets. This involved the construction of the second resource. Children 
played with many controls to identify the source of variation in results. Indeed the number of 
trials is one such control. In their search for powerful explanations and control over the 
behavior of the gadgets, children would typically discover or conjecture that the workings 
box could influence the appearance of the graphical output. Even when the number of trials 
was small, they would articulate expectations that changing the appearance of the workings 
box might have direct consequences for the appearance of the pie chart. We regard this 
insight as intuitively related to the concept of distribution. The Distribution resource, D, can 
be schematized as ―the more frequent an outcome in the workings box, the larger its sector in 
the pie chart.‖2 Some children were able to relate N and D to each other, expressing the idea 
that ―the more frequent an outcome in the workings box, the larger its sector in the pie chart, 
provided the number of trials is large‖. We regard this type of articulation as indicative of 
coordination across N and D. 
Let us summarize our argument to date. We have illustrated a model in which 
stochastic knowledge starts out as connected to a weakly coordinated set of primitive 
resources for randomness, abstracted from everyday experience, and with many of the 
attributes of p-prims. There appear to be few (if any) high-priority resources associated with 
long-term aggregated behavior. Tuning towards expertise can occur in the sense that two new 
resources, the Large Number and the Distribution resources might emerge through interaction 
with carefully designed external resources, and illustrative evidence for how these new 
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resources emerge will be presented in the next two sections. Further, we will illustrate the 
apparent coordination of N and D. 
We now turn to elements 4 and 5, the relationship between the knowledge and the 
setting. The data in elements 4 and 5 is chronological and is offered as illustration for theory 
for the micro-evolution of mathematical knowledge. The story begins with two children, 
Anne and Rebecca, both age 10, engaging with the gadgets at top level i.e. not using the 
mending tools that reside inside each gadget. The story develops as they first play with the 
COIN gadget, then the SPINNER and finally the DICE gadget. 
Element 4: The role of setting 
Anne and Rebecca at top level 
We have already illustrated (in element 1) the nature of naïve knowledge and (in 
element 3) the Large Number, N, and the Distribution, D, resources. We now wish to trace 
the cueing and construction of N and D alongside that of more naïve knowledge and the use 
of external resources. 
Figure 5 summarizes the data in the form of a trace, which charts the evolution of the 
internal resources as articulated by Anne and Rebecca. Figure 5 displays the approximate 
times when Anne and Rebecca articulated particular internal resources. The ―events‖ 
indicated on the trace often spanned several minutes; the positioning of the resources on the 
trace gives a rough indication of the timing. On some occasions these resources were 
expressed as conjectures, ―perhaps the strength controls the number on the dice,‖ whereas on 
others the children seemed to be proposing a conclusion, ―the more often you throw the dice, 
the more even the pie chart gets.‖ It is not always easy to make this distinction. For our 
purposes, the distinction is not critical, since, whether conjecturing or forming a conclusion, 
the same internal resource is being cued. 
Figure 5 
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In Figure 5, we see many events in the first section of the trace where naïve knowledge 
was cued. During this first period, Anne and Rebecca were asked to play with the gadgets at 
top level, partly to gain a feel for the gadgets but also to form some initial views as to which 
gadgets seemed to be working properly and which might be broken. This play was at top 
level; they had not yet been introduced to the tools within each gadget. The main control 
available to Anne and Rebecca was the strength control. In playing with the coin, Anne said 
that she was testing it
3
: 
1. Anne: . . . to see if it comes up tails again. 
We can interpret this comment either as testing the COIN’s irregularity, based on a 
perceived pattern in previous results, or as testing its unpredictability as shown on the trace. 
A few moments later, the girls were proposing that the computer was exerting control, a 
special case of steerability. 
2. Dave: Do you think the COIN is random? 
3. Rebecca: Not really . . . it’s probably been programmed to do it, in a loop. 
4. Anne: I don’t know. 
5. Dave: What do you mean by ―in a loop?‖ 
6. Rebecca: Well, it’s programmed to do heads, then maybe heads again and then 
tails. 
7. Dave: In some sort of pattern? 
8. Rebecca: Yes. 
9. Dave: Did you pick up some sort of pattern? 
10. Rebecca: Not really. 
In line 2, Rebecca is dealing directly with the task of deciding which gadgets are working 
properly. Rebecca’s argument is that the COIN is not random because it is programmed. 
(Rebecca had a fairly sophisticated appreciation of the operation of computers.) We take this 
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as further support of how Rebecca regarded unsteerability as a facet of how a coin should 
behave. 
When they moved onto the SPINNER, Anne’s fairness resource was cued (line 11). 
11. Anne: I think it might be a bit unfair because the one is much bigger than the 
others . . . The two, three, four and five is much smaller than the one, so one has 
more of a chance. 
The unsteerability resource was also apparently cued since the girls tried to test whether the 
size of the strength control influenced the outcome (line 12). 
12. Rebecca: I don’t think you can really control it, because if you do it slowly, you 
never know, it could come on a three, if it starts off on a different number. 
Rebecca felt at that time that the strength did not seem to control the outcome and instead 
conjectured that the outcome might be connected with the position of the number on the 
spinner. Anne and Rebecca frequently returned throughout the interview to similarly 
deterministic explanations of phenomena, which they could not find a way of describing 
otherwise. 
We believe that the prevalence of conjectures and conclusions based on naïve 
knowledge during this preliminary stage can be accounted for in two main ways: 
(i) Anne and Rebecca described phenomena in terms of their naïve resources, since these 
were of much higher cueing priority than resources associated with longer-term 
aggregated behavior (or more extremely the girls may, as yet, have had no access to 
such resources for aggregated behavior). 
(ii) The strength control tool available at top level cued the use of unsteerability and 
unpredictability. In effect, the natural thing to do was to play with the strength control 
and test out ideas based on it. In contrast, there was no specific encouragement at top 
level to record or aggregate results. 
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Anne and Rebecca inside the COIN 
When Anne and Rebecca moved onto work with the tools within the COIN gadget, 
similar p-prims were cued. In addition, the availability of the results box cued irregularity by 
offering a means of recording results. This period of exploration allowed Anne and Rebecca 
to try out conjectures related to the effect of strength. They found that none of these resources 
provided a consistent explanation of the COIN’s behavior, as illustrated by this extract in 
which the girls had been conjecturing that there was a regularity to the COIN’s results. 
13. Dave: What do you feel, Rebecca, about what you were saying before that it would 
work to a pattern? Do you think there is a pattern? 
14. Anne: Oh yes, I can see a bit of a pattern. Because that’s got head, head, head, tail, 
and it’s got . . . oh, where was it? I can’t think . . . oh yes, it’s got a head, oh no, 
that’s not right, it’s got tail, tail, tail, tail, that time. 
15. Rebecca: I’m not too sure. 
16. Anne: I don’t think there’s much of a pattern really. 
17. Dave: Did you expect there to be a pattern from what you were saying before? 
18. Rebecca: Yes, I did. 
The availability of the pie chart led to Anne and Rebecca to consider aggregated 
patterns. The speed with which the computer generated results also made it easy for them to 
consider large-scale experiments. Even so, there was some reluctance to do so. Because Anne 
and Rebecca did not start new experiments, there was a gradual accumulation of results, and 
a tendency to increase the number of trials each time as confidence grew. At each stage, the 
charts were consulted and comments were made about the evenness or otherwise of the pie 
chart or pictogram. This process resulted in a recognition that the pie chart became ―more 
even‖ as more trials were included in the experiment, the first articulation of N, after twenty 
minutes of trying to make sense of the COIN gadget. 
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19. Anne: I think it’s the highest the number, the even more it gets. 
20. Dave: The higher the number, the more even it gets? (Dave reverses the two words 
―more‖ and ―even.‖) 
21. Anne: Yes.  
22. Dave: Do you agree, Rebecca? 
23. Rebecca: Because the other time, when we did less numbers, it was half um . . . 
even really. 
24. Dave: Do you agree with that--the more times you do it, the more even it’s getting? 
25. Rebecca: Yes, it seems to be. 
The context made it clear that by ―number‖ in line 19, Anne meant the number of trials 
in the experiment. 
We believe that the Anne and Rebecca articulated N at this time because: 
(i) The pie chart and the pictogram focused attention on aggregated results. 
(ii) The design of the Chance-Maker environment made accumulation of results natural 
and the researcher’s interventions gave such activity positive feedback. 
(iii) Resources like unpredictability were insufficient to explain the emerging 
predictability of the pie chart. 
Anne and Rebecca inside the SPINNER 
When Anne and Rebecca began to work with the SPINNER gadget, one might have 
expected them to begin by using N. In fact, this did not happen. The ―unfair‖ appearance of 
the SPINNER caught their attention. The numbered lines up to this point have all referred 
directly to transcripts of discussions with or between Anne and Rebecca. In places, such as 
line 29, we have also numbered descriptive notations of the videotape, where these are direct 
quotations from our own translations of the tape. 
26. Anne: Oh, look, it’s got to choose from different numbers. 
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27. Rebecca: That’s definitely more chance of it landing on one then. 
28. Anne: Yes . . . There’s more chance of it because that’s (pointing to the 1 sector) 
much bigger than these (pointing to the other four sectors). 
29. They make the strength 50 and do 50 trials. The pictogram shows most ones, then 
fours with threes the least. The pie chart confirms this. 
30. Anne: It’s a bit like that really (pointing to the spinner). I thought it would be more 
because one’s more of a chance of getting there because it is much bigger. 
31. Dave: Is the SPINNER random? 
32. Rebecca: Not really . . . because there is more chance of it landing on one, than the 
other numbers. 
Anne and Rebecca wanted to make the SPINNER fair and the only way to do this was 
through the workings box. For the first time, the workings box became a focus of their 
activity. They edited the workings to read: choose-from [1 2 3 4 5]. However, they only 
chose to carry out 50 trials and the pie chart did not appear fair, showing a larger 5 sector. 
Dave asked the girls how the pie chart might be made to look fair expecting to cue N. 
33. Dave: If your aim was to make that pie chart look more even, what would you do? 
34. Anne: I’d make the five a bit smaller. . . 
35. Rebecca: I’d make the others a bit bigger. 
36. They begin to edit the workings. 
37. Anne: Why don’t you put them all the same number? That would be even then. 
Like put three on one, three on two. That would be fair because that would be even 
then. 
The question (line 33) was answered first in terms of the pie chart itself and then in 
terms of the workings box. Anne’s response showed that she understood that the workings 
box could influence the appearance of the pie chart (and thus is an articulation of D) but she 
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did not have a proportional view. In fact, the girls settled on a workings box that read: 
choose-from [1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5]. They again used 50 trials as a new experiment 
suggesting that N was still not being cued. The pie chart was not fair, displaying most ones, 
provoking this reaction: 
38. Rebecca: I wonder what would happen if we took one more away? 
Again Rebecca showed that she appreciated a link between the workings box and the pie 
chart but she did not yet recognize that they were using too few trials. They went on to edit 
the workings to read: choose-from [1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5]. After 50 trials, the pie chart 
showed most threes. They edited the workings back to read: choose-from [1 2 3 4 5] but 
50 more trials still showed a bias, now towards 1s. 
39. Anne: It’s a tiny bit even but there are more ones. 
40. Rebecca: Yes, definitely more ones. 
41. Anne: Yes, but it’s fairly even, if you see what I mean. 
42. Dave: So, if you are trying to make this pie chart more even what could you do? 
43. Rebecca: Maybe throw it more times like we did with the coin? 
44. Anne: Yes. 
For the first time during the work with the SPINNER, N had been cued. Over the next 
few minutes, Anne and Rebecca tried increasing numbers of trials and found that the pie 
chart came out more and more fair. 
45. Rebecca: There’s a higher number, so the more chance of it being even, I think . . . 
The more times you throw it, the evener it seems to get. And I think that’s because 
there’s more chances for a number to come up than if you do it say fifty times. 
Anne and Rebecca had been working with the SPINNER intensively for nearly 15 
minutes before N was cued even though they had articulated N at the end of working with the 
COIN gadget. We make the following observations about Anne and Rebecca’s activity: 
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 N, as constructed during the COIN activity, was available as a resource for sense-making 
as evidenced towards the end of the SPINNER activity. 
 N, during the early part of the SPINNER activity, had low cueing priority as shown by the 
considerable delay before it was evoked as a resource. 
 N had low cueing priority at this time because the SPINNER’s appearance cued the 
fairness p-prim, in effect blocking the cueing of N. 
 The need to make the SPINNER fair encouraged the use of the workings box, which led 
to the construction of D. The focus on seeing the workings box as a control distracted the 
girls from considering the number of trials as a control. 
 N was eventually cued because neither D nor any part of their naïve knowledge could 
satisfactorily explain the SPINNER’s unfair pie chart. 
The unfolding of the above activity structure reveals how the children brought their 
naïve internal resources to bear towards their goal of making the spinner work properly. The 
setting allowed the children to explore the gadgets with some confidence to search for 
patterns of behavior. The interaction of internal and external resources allowed the children 
to construct new internal resources to make sense of the COIN’s behavior. 
Element 5: Unfamiliar settings 
Anne and Rebecca inside the DICE 
The trace in Figure 5 shows a marked difference in the nature of the internal resources 
cued during DICE activity and during SPINNER activity. There is relatively little evidence of 
the use of naïve knowledge (though it has not, of course, completely ―disappeared‖). Now, N 
is cued quickly and D is cued soon after. In fact, Anne and Rebecca began using 1000 trials 
from the start of their work with the DICE gadget. 
46. Dave: What’s the advantage of doing it a thousand times? 
47. Anne: You get more and you can sort of estimate. 
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48. Dave: What do you think will happen to the pie chart? 
49. Anne: Maybe a bit even. 
50. Rebecca: Maybe it’s going to be even again because it seems to go more even the 
more times you throw it. 
51. Anne: I think it’s the more you throw it, the more even it gets. 
52. Rebecca: Yes, that seems to be the case. 
53. Anne: Because that’s what happened most of the times, the more you get, the more 
even you get. 
Here, N was used inappropriately; they assumed the unfairness in the pie chart could be 
smoothed out by applying more trials. Having proved to have explanatory power in both the 
COIN and the SPINNER, N has taken on high priority, thus dominating the recently 
constructed D. Anne and Rebecca also have available the fairness resource, which perhaps 
makes them predisposed to an expectation that the pie chart should be fair. The mutually 
supportive nature of N and the fairness resource possibly raise the cueing priority of both.  
When the pie chart showed too many sixes, Anne and Rebecca’s attention was drawn to 
the workings box. 
54. Anne: I think sixes is popular because there’s quite a lot of sixes in the choose-
from (pointing to the workings box) . . . There might be a lot more sixes so it’s got 
more chances of getting more sixes on it. 
A few minutes after beginning to work with the DICE gadget, Anne articulated the 
influence of the workings box in the sense that the bias towards the sixes was causing the pie 
chart to look non-uniform. As a result, Anne and Rebecca began to edit the workings box 
and, after considering choose-from [1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6], they settled on 
choose-from [1 2 3 4 5 6]. They carried out 1000 trials and the pie chart appeared fair. 
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Dave wished to probe how Anne and Rebecca understood this result and the earlier one when 
the DICE had been biased towards sixes. 
55. Dave: So, doing it lots of times, like a thousand, has made it more even this time, 
but, before we altered it when the workings were as before, it didn’t make it more 
even. So, what do you think it did do? 
56. Rebecca: Because there’s more chance of getting a six. When it stops it might land 
on a six. 
57. Anne: Because the workings were unfair. 
Now, about 13 minutes after beginning to work with the DICE gadget, Dave probed Anne 
and Rebecca’s emerging sense of the role of the workings box. 
58. Dave: Let’s say we were playing a game, and for some peculiar reason in this 
game, it would have to be a computer game because we are using the computer 
dice, we wanted there to be a good chance of getting ones, and a fairly good chance 
of getting twos but a pretty low chance of getting anything else. It’s a strange 
game. How would we make this dice behave like that? 
59. Rebecca: You have to put more of the numbers on here. 
60. She begins to edit the workings until they read: 
choose-from [1 1 2 2 3 4 5 6]. They test this out by repeating 1000 trials. 
61. Dave: What will the pie chart look like? 
62. Rebecca: More twos, more ones and less of the others. 
63. Dave: How will the ones and twos compare? 
64. Anne: Roughly even. 
Anne and Rebecca were now recognizing limitations of N, which had not been apparent 
when they began working with the DICE gadget. In other words, they seemed to have begun 
to construct a relationship between N and D. 
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We now wish to illustrate how N and D can became coordinated. Anne and Rebecca 
were able to discuss how the pie chart’s appearance reflected that of the workings box, 
provided the number of trials was high; we will refer to the coordinated resource as N-D. A 
corollary to N is that small numbers of trials are likely to generate non-uniform pie charts. 
When the two resources are coordinated properly, the corollary can be articulated as a 
suggestion that the pie chart may not reflect the appearance of the workings box when the 
number of trials is low. Anne and Rebecca expressed this idea towards the end of their period 
of working with the DICE. 
65. Dave: If we had done it only fifty times, instead of a thousand, do you think we 
would have got a picture like that? 
66. Anne and Rebecca (simultaneously): No. 
67. Anne: A bit more uneven. 
68. Rebecca: There’d be more ones and twos. 
69. Anne: They’d probably be about even. 
70. Rebecca: Maybe. 
71. Dave: What I had really wanted was for the ones to have a very good chance and 
the twos to have only a fairly good chance. 
72. Rebecca immediately edits the workings box to read: 
choose-from [1 1 1 2 2 3 4 5 6]. 
Anne’s comment (line 67) seems to indicate a coordination of N and D, though subsequently 
(lines 68-70) Anne and Rebecca may still have been cueing N inappropriately. 
We make the following observations about Anne and Rebecca’s activity at this point: 
 N had taken on higher cueing priority as a result of it having been found to be a reliable 
sense-making resource for two different contexts, the COIN and the SPINNER 
 N was also likely to be cued because of its consistency with the fairness resource (even 
though it was inappropriate to apply fairness to long-term behavior in this way). 
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 Less initial stress was placed on the workings box than had been the case with the 
SPINNER because there was no visual cue of unfairness in the appearance of the DICE. 
We believe that the coordination of N and D took place at this time because neither 
individually was sufficient to ―explain‖ the unfairness of the pie chart for an unfair workings 
box. 
Discussion 
We summarize the findings as follows. The children (exemplified by Anne and 
Rebecca) came to the computer-based interviews with access to four naïve resources, which 
we have called unpredictability, unsteerability, irregularity and fairness. These resources, 
similar to those employed by diSessa to describe p-prims in his model of conceptual change, 
dominated what children said throughout the interviews, although gradually--as new 
resources for long-term aggregated behavior emerged--they became restricted in use to 
describing short term behavior. 
During the interviews, we noted the emergence of two new resources: Large Number, 
N, and Distribution, D, which differed from the initial resources, in that: 
 they were associated with a mathematically coherent structure for randomness; 
 they were not isolated nor weakly connected but offered mutual support through their 
coordination;  
 they included within their articulation a consequence e.g. more trials leads to the 
consequence of a more even pie chart. 
N and D represented abstractions of long-term behavior, a sense of an invariant relation 
that connected the number of trials, the configuration of the workings box and the appearance 
of the pie chart. At the same, the articulation of N and D was bounded strongly within the 
linguistic and material resources available within the activity. N and D are situated 
abstractions, initially having low cueing priority, evidenced from the continued reliance on 
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naïve resources by Anne and Rebecca in moving from the COIN to the SPINNER gadgets. 
But as the task-interviews progressed, N and D took on higher cueing priority, until these 
became mutually coordinated. By coordinated here, we mean that by the end of the work with 
the DICE gadget, both resources were being used together as mutual support rather than in 
isolation--the graphical representation of the results was now seen as contingent on both the 
number of trials and the configuration of the distribution in the workings box.  
A model for the construction of situated abstraction 
We claimed earlier that a model of the micro-evolution of mathematical knowledge 
required five elements. We claim some progress in respect of elaborating these elements at 
the required level of detail which will offer further illumination on our three fundamental 
questions: (i) What is abstracted? (ii) How do abstractions evolve? (iii) Is mathematical 
abstraction de-contextualized? We believe that to attempt to answer these questions we must 
connect macro and micro models: our approach is to relate our macro construct of situated 
abstraction to the micro construct of p-prim. 
For the first element, we sought a clear description of the nature of naïve mathematical 
knowledge including the grain size of emergent mathematical knowledge. The naïve 
resources for randomness, unpredictability, unsteerability, irregularity and fairness, operate as 
a means of contextualizing phenomena. That is to say, the child identifies an aspect of a 
phenomenon, which triggers the unpredictability resource, say, enabling the triggering of 
other connected naïve resources such as unsteerability. Piaget and Inhelder (1951) have 
argued that the concept of randomness first emerges because, in contrast to all previous 
experiences, such phenomena are not explainable in terms of reversible operations. 
According to this view, random phenomena are fundamentally different from previously 
encountered situations and remain as such until the individual accommodates the concept of 
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probability. We suppose that contextualizing allows the organism to partition phenomena that 
do not conform to an operational structure. 
These naive resources for randomness do not have consequences and as a result have 
limited value for making sense of phenomena. In contrast, the typical p-prim enfolds a class 
of implications (for example, Ohm’s p-prim: more effort implies more results). In common 
with p-prims, we believe that naïve resources for randomness are abstracted directly from 
experience (playing with coins, dice and so on). Each becomes linked to aspects of the game-
playing situation in such a way that specificities (quite possibly superficial) of the 
environment trigger particular resources. Hence, the appearance of a dice might trigger 
fairness at one point in a game whereas a focus on how the player is throwing the spinner or 
dice might trigger unsteerability. The apparent structuring of these resources (in the sense that 
when one is cued so might another) is based mainly on their coincidental appearance in the 
same situation (such as game playing). Any such structuring is weak because of a lack of 
justification, which might suggest that two coincidental resources are in fact contradictory. 
The nature of what is abstracted changes through tuning towards mathematical expertise as 
we shall see in revisiting elements 3 to 5 of the micro-evolutionary model. 
Before then, we must consider the second element of the model. We described a setting 
that encouraged children to make conjectures and provided tools with which to express ideas 
and test out conjectures. The setting was designed to offer a range of situations in which 
mathematical resources for the aggregated behavior of random gadgets might prove to have 
explicative power. The Boxer environment was designed to provide a window for the 
researchers to observe the micro-evolution of knowledge about randomness, but at the same 
time to enable the children to scrutinize their own knowledge. We do not wish to suggest that 
the Chance-Maker environment itself (or any computer-based environment for that matter) 
has independent power to change children’s thinking. On the contrary, other factors in the 
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setting contributed in significant ways. The task of mending the gadgets was important as it 
pointed the children’s activity towards sense-making, and provided a point of reference for 
them in deciding whether that activity was complete. The questions and support from the 
researchers were sometimes critical in encouraging reflection and supporting them through 
technical difficulties. Nevertheless, Chance-Maker provided a framework in which this type 
of activity could naturally take place across contexts that differed in controlled ways, but 
contained certain common structures, such as the workings box and the graphing tools. We 
claim that the detailed elaboration of the setting, including the role of Chance-Maker, 
provides the second element of the model. 
For the third element of the model, we sought a detailed elaboration of the nature of 
new knowledge and its relation during evolution to prior knowledge. At the macro-level, we 
are able to refer to the children’s articulations, and it is these linguistic and physical actions 
that betray a dependence upon the structuring resources of the situation, and indicate the 
emergence of a situated abstraction. Linguistically, the children typically expressed their 
ideas in terms of the tools and resources available within Chance-Maker. More revealing still 
is the way that Anne and Rebecca appeared to reinvent, rather than simply re-use, the 
previously constructed situated abstraction, N, when moving from the COIN to the 
SPINNER. For them at least, N appeared to have narrow scope, at least in the first instance. 
Schematically we think of a situated abstraction as surrounded by a contextual neighborhood 
that describes the essential conditions, purposes, and features under which the situated 
abstraction was constructed. Recognition of the characteristics of the contextual 
neighborhood by the individual assists the identification of similar conditions under which 
the situated abstraction is triggered. In this sense, the idea of contextual neighborhood seems 
to be closely associated with diSessa’s micro-level notion of cueing priority. 
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We would like to share a useful metaphor we use for thinking about the relationship 
between the macro and micro-levels. We observe children through their actions and their 
words at the macro-level. We hear their explanations of phenomenological behavior. On 
analysis, we classify some of these articulations as situated abstractions. But now imagine 
applying a microscope to these situated abstractions. What we would see, according to this 
metaphor, is a collection of linked p-prims in the process of being triggered. We believe there 
are examples where we can identify the p-prims that underlie Anne and Rebecca’s 
articulations.  
On many occasions, Anne (lines 19, 47, 51, 53) and Rebecca (lines 23, 43, 50) 
articulate the N situated abstraction, underlying which we recognize an idea of ―more begets 
more‖, a precisely equivalent structure to the Ohm’s p-prim. Thus there seems, in this case at 
least, a simple mapping between situated abstractions at the macro-level and p-prims at the 
micro-level. 
More generally, it seems that the experience of working within the Chance-Maker 
setting allowed children to construct the N and D situated abstractions and that these 
articulations at the macro-level may signal new connections between the naive resources of 
randomness with existing or new p-prims. For example, a link between the unpredictability 
resource and the p-prims underlying the N situated abstraction would imply that, whilst a 
phenomenon may be recognized as random, it might still possess some degree of 
predictability in the long term. Furthermore, the co-ordination of N and D may have signaled 
further processing at the micro-level, the connecting of p-prims ―beneath‖ the two situated 
abstractions. 
For the fourth element of the model, we demanded an understanding of the relationship 
between new knowledge and the setting in which that knowledge is constructed. At the 
macro-level, Chance-Maker encouraged the construction of situated abstractions. In the study 
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reported above, randomness was instantiated as a manipulable computational system, so that 
children could see and act on the mechanisms of objects such as dice and coins. In other 
words, we built a system that phenomenonalized the abstract, making it concrete. This is the 
key affordance of mathematical microworlds. A continuity of structuring resources from 
situation to situation (for example, the role and appearance of the workings box was common 
across the gadgets), though not necessarily immediately recognized by children, offered the 
opportunity for situated abstractions involving those structuring resources to have 
explanatory power beyond specific situations. At the same time, mathematically redundant 
tools (such as the strength control) built into the design allowed children to recognize that 
redundancy. In other words, the setting was designed to optimize tuning towards expertise by 
giving maximal support to expert-like resources. 
Our analysis of children’s articulations across situations enables us to elaborate the fifth 
element of the model, illuminating the degree of dependence on context. As part of tuning 
towards expertise, knowledge within a contextual neighborhood becomes less tied into the 
specific context of its genesis. Given new situations which have some similar features to 
those already experienced, and particularly in an environment--like Chance-Maker--in which 
prior resources can be road-tested, the contextual neighborhood can evolve and broaden into 
a domain of validity that describes the variety of circumstances in which a p-prim might be 
triggered. In other words, knowledge cannot escape from context, but the range of contexts in 
which it might be cued can and does broaden, as new connections are made. We saw how, in 
the study, the children began with a narrowly defined contextual neighborhood for the Large 
Number situated abstraction, N, applied precisely to the COIN gadget. When they began 
work with the SPINNER, there was no reason to suppose that N applied, or to put it more 
succinctly, that the phenomena observed while playing with SPINNER lay within the 
contextual neighborhood defined by COIN. Anne and Rebecca found that the resources they 
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had to hand were insufficient for making sense of the COIN, and used N as a way of 
overcoming the difficulty. In doing so, they found that it worked for both the COIN and the 
SPINNER: the contextual neighborhood for N expanded, with the result that N was called 
upon relatively quickly when Anne and Rebecca began to work with the DICE gadget. 
Concluding remarks 
We have described in some detail five elements that constitute a model for the micro-
evolution of mathematical knowledge in the case of randomness. There are obvious 
limitations to the generalizability of our data, not least that the analysis emerges from 
reflection on data from just 32 children, and is illustrated here through the activity of just 
two. Despite these limitations, we believe that our model may have some explanatory and 
predictive power for making sense of the evolution of children’s ideas of randomness and 
probability and may perhaps offer a framework for understanding the construction of 
mathematical meanings more generally. 
From the point of view of randomness and probability, one of the striking findings of 
the literature is the inconsistent nature of student responses to stochastic situations (for 
example, Konold et al., 1993), responses that appear to be sensitive to the situation (Nisbett 
et al., 1983). Searching for a model of learning about the stochastic has, as a result, been 
problematic. The proposed model in this paper provides a micro-level explanation for such 
inconsistency, in the sense that naïve resources for randomness only serve to contextualize 
randomness and have no power to offer rational explanations of long-term behavior. At the 
same time, the model suggests that settings with particular properties (e.g., those attributes of 
Chance-Maker highlighted above) would support the construction of more expert-like, but 
situationally dependent abstractions about aggregated  behavior. 
It is reasonable to ask whether the types of insights gained by children from working 
with Chance-Maker are transferable to domains that are not computationally mediated. The 
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abstractions, N and D, are situated in the sense that they are constituted within the Chance-
Maker context and derive their immediate meaning from that context. In this sense, the 
notion of situated abstraction is entirely consistent with Lave’s hypothesis that knowledge is 
situated and the notion of transfer is an irrelevance. However, through reflection on 
children’s attempts to make sense of new gadgets within the microworld, we predict in our 
model what will happen when children explore situations beyond the confines of Chance-
Maker. We regard those situations as new domains for sense-making, just as the DICE was a 
new domain beyond the spinner, and the SPINNER was a new domain after the COIN. N and 
D live in the minds of those children. Some of the 32 original children will have organized N 
and D with greater priorities than others. They may well call upon N and D more readily than 
other children in situations where they are trying to make sense of stochastic phenomena. If 
the new situation is superficially different from that experienced in Chance-Maker then naïve 
resources, such as unpredictability, may be triggered. These resources will only be rejected if 
they fail to have explanatory power in those new situations. Real world situations often fail to 
provide feedback that indicates such failure, and under those circumstances N and D may 
remain dormant. 
Of course, treating the world as just another domain of abstraction is highly 
speculative, and is not – at least on the basis of the study reported here – justified by the 
corpus of data on which the model is grounded
4
. Nevertheless, the micro-level mechanism at 
work in the model for generating and coordinating situated abstractions do not, on the face of 
it, appear necessarily to be tied to the specificities of the domain we constructed, except, of 
course, that we designed it as carefully as we could to maximize the probability of conceptual 
change.  
Our final word briefly outlines a possible framework for applying the model beyond the 
case of randomness, and to revisit the question of context with which we began. We propose 
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that de-contextualization and contextualization might usefully be viewed not as antithetical 
but as different perspectives on the same micro-evolution of mathematical knowledge. 
Meanings--internal resources--are created by experiences, which can evolve from webbing 
connections between mental states as much as between a mental state and the physical world. 
These resources remain rooted in actual experience. Both naïve resources and situated 
abstractions are abstracted through making connections at the micro-level, the latter with 
consequences. So far so good. But what of mathematics as viewed by mathematicians, in 
which mathematical meaning appears to depend on being cut loose from context? We believe 
that what appears to the mathematician as an abstraction away from, and independent of, 
context, is in fact a broadening of contextual neighborhood. It is this model of abstraction 
taking place within, rather than outside, a context that elaborates the notion of situated 
abstraction. De-contextualization is a post-hoc perspective on mathematical knowledge that 
does not necessarily assist in understanding the trajectories of learning, which, according to 
our model, emerges out of a broadening of, rather than a cutting away from, context.  
On the other hand, it is unhelpful to offer a perspective in which mathematical 
knowledge is trapped within a situation. When knowledge is constructed, new ideas may 
gradually gain higher priority within that domain but will continue to possess low priority in 
unfamiliar settings. When environments are made available in which those same ideas prove 
to be the most powerful sense-makers of activity within that environment, our model would 
suggest that these apparently situated meanings will take on higher priority within the 
unfamiliar setting.  
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1
 Andy diSessa heads a team at Berkeley, which is developing a ―computational 
medium,‖ named Boxer. This project is seen as extending the notion of literacy to a new 
domain, where users express themselves in various ways, including mathematically, in 
various modalities (graphic, literal, computational . . .). 
2
 This schematisation places no emphasis on proportion, which is probably a fair 
reflection of the how the D resource was articulated. A few children discovered that a 
workings box that read: choose-from [1 2 3 4 5 6] was essentially the same as one 
which read: choose-from [1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6]. Most children however 
articulated D in terms of the frequency of an outcome rather than its proportion. 
3
 We have re-numbered the lines from our case accounts in a way that is convenient for 
this paper. The excerpts are taken from various sections of the data and, even though different 
excerpts are numbered consecutively in this paper, they did not necessarily occur 
immediately one after the other in real time. 
4
 We have, however, made some  progress  in this direction in the context of studying 
mathematical knowledge in workplace contexts: see,  for example,  Hoyles, Noss and Pozzi 
(2001); Noss, Hoyles and Pozzi (in press). 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. The COIN gadget 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The tools in the COIN gadget 
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Figure 3. The workings inside the SPINNER gadget 
 
 
Figure 4. The workings inside the DICE gadget 
 
 
Figure 5. A time trace showing when Anne and Rebecca articulated various resources 
Light circle = primitive resource; Bold circle = new resource; Filled circle = coordinated 
resource. 
P = unpredictability; S = unsteerability; F = unfairness. 
I = irregularity; N = large number; D = distribution. 
